Research on the Soft Law Incentive Mechanism for Coordinated Regional Economic Development

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the in-depth advancement of the regional economic coordinated development strategy and the construction of a unified national market, the traditional hard law governance model is difficult to adapt to the complexity and dynamics of cross-regional cooperation due to its rigid constraints. The soft law incentive mechanism, with its characteristics of flexible constraints and consultative governance, has become an important supplement. Based on institutional economics, soft law governance theory and regional rule of law theory, this article systematically analyzes the theoretical basis and functional value of soft law in reducing transaction costs, promoting consultative co-governance and facilitating the synergy of soft and hard laws. Based on China’s practice, it is found that soft law faces practical difficulties in regional economic coordination, such as lagging institutional supply, imbalance in the coordination between soft and hard laws, insufficient coverage of norms, and weak implementation efficiency. The research proposes to promote the transformation of the soft law incentive mechanism in regional economic governance from “form innovation” to “efficiency improvement” through paths such as establishing a predictive formulation mechanism, strengthening the transformation of soft and hard laws, and improving the full-cycle management, providing institutional support for deepening regional coordinated development.