

A Study of Non-Traditional Security Cooperation Between India and the European Union

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Abstract

In today's world, globalization brings with it a variety of opportunities and challenges, and the intertwining of traditional and non-traditional security threats creates complex challenges to national security. In the face of increasingly complex non-traditional security issues such as climate change, terrorism, and public health incidents, international cooperation has become an important option. India, a country that is rapidly emerging as a significant power in the Indo-Pacific region, has demonstrated its growing economic and military strength, as well as its active involvement in global governance. In this context, the European Union (EU), a unique normative force, has also increased its focus on India in recent years and is actively approaching India. This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of cooperation between India and the EU in the realm of non-traditional security. It delves into the historical background, the current state of collaboration, and the prevailing challenges that lie ahead. The study of non-traditional security cooperation between India and the EU could potentially serve as a valuable reference for the future non-traditional security cooperation between China and Europe and China and India. Additionally, it could contribute to enhancing global non-traditional security cooperation between the North and South.

Keywords: India, The European Union, India-EU relations, non-traditional security, global cooperation

1. Introduction

In recent years, the global geopolitical landscape has undergone profound transformations, with the Indo-Pacific region rapidly ascending in strategic importance and attracting heightened attention from major global powers. In this situation, India and the European Union (EU) have increasingly deepened their collaboration on non-traditional security issues such as energy transition and public health. In September 2021, the EU officially released The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing

that developments in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly intertwined with EU interests. Research on India-EU non-traditional security cooperation not only enhances our understanding of the EU's strategic trajectory and India's evolving strategic intentions but also contribute to enhancing global non-traditional security cooperation between the Global North and South.

2. Literature Review

International scholarship on India-EU

cooperation spans both broad overviews and specific analyses. For example, Rajendra K. Jain (2023) focuses on non-traditional security challenges, exploring potential cooperation in trade, counterterrorism, nuclear security, refugee governance, and human rights. Sakti Prasad Srichandan (2019) argues that while India does not regard the EU as a primary political partner, bilateral engagement should transcend economic negotiations to prioritize shared interests alongside values-based collaboration in security domains.¹

Chinese scholars have also established a comprehensive and distinctive theoretical framework in the field of non-traditional security studies. These researchers have also examined the impact of the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy on China-EU relations. For instance, Li Jingkun, Zhang Lei, Zhao Chen, Cao Hui, and Zhang Haiyang (2017) from the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences provide an exhaustive analysis of China-EU political relations in their monograph *China-EU Political Relations*, covering political, economic, cultural, and global governance dimensions while offering expert assessments of future bilateral dynamics.²

This study innovatively evaluates India-EU non-traditional security cooperation, offering fresh perspectives on its important role in bilateral relations. By incorporating multilingual sources, the research enriches its theoretical depth and analytical rigor.

3. History of EU-India Cooperation

Following the establishment of the European Community through the 1957 Treaty of Rome.³ India's engagement with Europe remained limited until the post-Cold War era. The 1990s was a turning point as India's economic liberalization and the EU's expansion catalyzed closer ties. The EU's "Towards a New Asia Strategy" signified a strategic shift in Europe's Asian policy, creating institutional opportunities

for India-EU dialogue.⁴

The 2004 Hague Summit elevated bilateral relations to a 'Strategic Partnership', formalizing five priority cooperation areas under the New Strategic Partnership Agreement. ⁵From 2006 to 2016, mechanisms such as annual summits and joint working groups became central to bilateral engagement. ⁶The 2016-2020 period witnessed accelerated collaboration in non-traditional security, notably through the EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership (CECP) and the India-EU Water Partnership (IEWP),⁷ which aligned with India's domestic initiatives.⁸

EU-India relations have witnessed significant progress. The establishment of the EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in 2023 represents a crucial institutional achievement in bilateral cooperation, serving as a critical platform for advancing strategic partnerships. ⁹Notably, negotiations regarding the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) have been reignited, signaling potential breakthroughs in economic integration. However, empirical analysis reveals that recent collaborative outcomes between the EU and India demonstrate an increasingly discernible correlation with geopolitical determinants, suggesting complex interactions between strategic interests and cooperative frameworks.

¹ Jain, R.K., G. Sachdeva. (2019). India-EU strategic partnership: a new roadmap. *Asia Europe Journal*, 17(3), p.309-325.

² Hong Zhou. (2017). *China-EU Political Relations*. Singapore: Springer, pp. 35-69.

³ European Union: History of the European Union 1945-59, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59_en, Accessed: 16 January 2025.

⁴ European Union. (13 July 1994). Towards a new Asia strategy: Communication from the Commission to the Council, <https://aei.pitt.edu/2949/1/2949.pdf>. Accessed: 30 December 2024.

⁵ Commission of the European Communities: Communication from the commission to the council, the European parliament and the European economic and social committee, 11 December 2019. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>. Accessed: December 20, 2024.

⁶ India Embassy Brussels: India-European Union Bilateral Relations, 6 October 2023, <https://indianembassybrussels.gov.in/pdf/230930%20Unclassified%20India-EU%20Bilateral%20Brief.pdf>. Accessed: 21 December 2024.

⁷ European Commission, Energy, Climate change, Environment: India, 18 January 2025, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/international-cooperation/key-partner-countries-and-regions/india_en, 18 January 2025.

⁸ European Union. (30 March 2016). EU-India Agenda for Action-2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122862/20160330-agenda-action-eu-india.pdf>, Accessed 14 October 2024.

⁹ European Parliament. (April 2022). EU-India Trade and Technology Council. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/757587/EPRS_ATA\(2024\)757587_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/757587/EPRS_ATA(2024)757587_EN.pdf). Accessed: 30 December 2024.

4. Status of India-EU Non-Traditional Security Cooperation

Non-traditional security topics are richer in EU-India cooperation. Currently, the EU sees India as its key pillar in the Indo-Pacific region, both economically and geopolitically. Both sides have stepped up their actions in the Indo-Pacific region to achieve their geopolitical goals, making India the EU's preferred partner in reducing its dependence on a single country. The EU's aggressive pivot to the Indo-Pacific region is in dire need of focus, and the area of non-traditional security is where its influence will be most prominent. Therefore, this section will focus on three typical non-traditional security issues, namely climate change, energy transition and terrorism, to provide an account of the current state of EU-India non-traditional security cooperation.

4.1 Governance of Climate Change

As early as 2004, the EU and India had undertaken joint research on climate change and natural disasters. ¹ However, policy dialogue and cooperation mechanisms at the governmental level began in 2005 with the first India-EU Summit on Climate Change. In addition, India and the EU have continued to advance their cooperation in multilateral settings: in 2019, the EU engaged with India and other G20 countries and established the Strategic Partnership for the Paris Agreement (SPIPA) to promote policy change in climate change governance, foster bilateral cooperation and investment, and raise public awareness on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. ² In 2020, India and the EU jointly developed and committed to work closely on a global framework for biodiversity conservation, which was eventually adopted at the United Nations Conference on Biodiversity in 2021.

Since Prime Minister Modi's 2014 inauguration coinciding with the Paris Agreement, India and the EU have prioritized climate action. Collaborative efforts focus on financing,

technology cooperation and infrastructure. Between 2012 and 2023, the EU allocated €4.6 million to Indian environmental projects targeting water management, sanitation, and community resilience.³ Despite progress, India's conservative climate policies and implementation gaps contrast with the EU's leadership, creating opportunities for future cooperation in energy pricing and regulatory frameworks.⁴

4.2 Cooperation on *Energiewende*

The concept of '*Energiewende*' (energy transition), originally coined in Germany, refers to the structural transformation in a nation's energy consumption paradigm whereby one dominant energy source is replaced by another. ⁵ Currently, India's energy consumption pattern remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, exhibiting a relatively homogeneous structure.

Against this background, bilateral cooperation in energy transition has progressively intensified. The collaborative agenda encompasses renewable energy transition, eco-city development, and smart grid infrastructure construction. This partnership continues through substantial EU financial support and technology transfers aimed at facilitating India's energy transformation. A notable example includes the EU's 2017 financing program for renewable energy projects in Rajasthan, Telangana, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, designed to increase India's renewable energy capacity. ⁶ The EU-India collaboration spans multiple domains including renewable energy development, energy infrastructure modernization, and green finance mechanisms, operationalized through technical cooperation and policy-financial frameworks.

¹ Carine Barbier, Ritu Mathur. (2008). Opportunities for an India-European Union Partnership on Energy and Climate Security, Paris: Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI), <http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/Opportunities-for-an-India-European-Union-Partnership-on-Energy-and-Climate-Security>. Accessed: 22 January 2025.

² Rajendra K. Jain. (2023). India and Europe in a Changing World: Context, Confrontation, Cooperation, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan Singapore.

³ SWITCH Asia, "India", <https://www.switch-asia.eu/countries/southeast-asia/india/>. Accessed: 30 December 2024.

⁴ European Parliament. (November 2020). EU-India: Cooperation on climate. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/659348/EPRS_BRI\(2020\)659348_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/659348/EPRS_BRI(2020)659348_EN.pdf). Accessed: 18 February 2025.

⁵ Krause, F., et al. (1980). *Energie-Wende: Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Erdöl und Uran: ein Alternativ-Bericht des Öko-Instituts*, Freiburg: S. Fischer, p. 13.

⁶ EIB. (19 December 2017). India: Renewable energy investment gets USD 400 million boost from new European Investment Bank – YES BANK initiative. <https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2017-387-renewable-energy-investment-across-india-gets-usd-400-million-boost-from-new-european-investment-bank-yes-bank-initiative>. Accessed: 23 January 2025.

This strategic partnership yields mutual benefits: India advances its national energy objectives while the EU secures market expansion opportunities in the Indo-Pacific energy sector. Nevertheless, challenges persist in operationalizing this cooperation. Issues such as suboptimal efficacy of capital and technology transfers, multifaceted policy coordination complexities, and political system influences on transnational collaboration require systematic investigation. These impediments underscore the necessity for enhanced institutional mechanisms to optimize the implementation of joint energy transition initiatives.

4.3 Collaboration on Counter-Terrorism

Since terrorism emerged as a global security priority in the early 21st century, Europe has maintained an intrinsic connection to this challenge, while South Asia has evolved into a critical theater of terrorist activities. At the multilateral level, both parties are signatories to the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, committed to advancing its implementation domestically and globally.¹ However, the cooperation between India and EU started around 2016, culminating in a reinforced commitment formalized during the 13th India-EU Summit in March 2016, which explicitly prioritized collaborative counterterrorism efforts.

In recent years, divergences in cyber counterterrorism governance have revealed complementarity in Indo-EU collaboration. By contrast, India adopts a “hard security” paradigm, mobilizing traditional instruments including military, naval, air forces, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and judicial systems. Conversely, the EU emphasizes “soft security” approaches characterized by intelligence-sharing frameworks, policy harmonization mechanisms, and technical assistance programs.

In summary, EU-India counter-terrorism cooperation demonstrates steady progress, featuring focuses on prevention, countering terrorist financing, and operational responses. This partnership exhibits growing emphasis on cyber-enabled counter-terrorism. This domain has emerged as one of the most productive areas within EU-India non-traditional security

collaboration, reflecting both their adaptive strategies in addressing 21st-century asymmetric security challenges.

5. Challenges in Cooperation

As the actors in the multi-polarization process, the non-traditional security cooperation between India and the European Union (EU) encompasses both constructive contributions to global governance and challenges stemming from institutional deficiencies and constraining factors. During the third decade of the 21st century, India and the EU have actively institutionalized cooperative mechanisms and dialogues. Nevertheless, these efforts remain constrained by imperfect institutional design, the EU’s limited operational efficacy, and persistent value-based divergences.

5.1 Institutional Deficiencies

As the cooperation projects are carried out on the ground, the shortcomings of the cooperation mechanism continue to be exposed. Firstly, the non-traditional security cooperation mechanism between India and the EU is still a framework, and still lacks sufficient concrete projects to support it. EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership, for example, in the official website of the “completed projects” column only eight completed projects, including India and Europe to build a hydroelectric power plant project is still in the planning and proposal stage, so far three years there is still no follow-up to promote the future of when it can be built on the ground is still not clear.² Secondly, the system is under pressure to improve. From the internal point of view, India and Europe in the field of non-traditional security capabilities and technical level differences, which makes the existing cooperation mechanism is mainly manifested in the EU’s unilateral support for India.

In short, although India and Europe in the field of non-traditional security cooperation has made some progress, but due to the framework characteristics of the cooperation mechanism, the implementation of the content of the lack of depth, as well as the two sides in the capacity and technical differences and other factors, India and the European Union in the field of non-traditional security cooperation between

¹ UNCCT. (2006). United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/zh/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy>. Accessed: 24 January 2025.

² EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership, “Completed Projects”, 15 August 2024, <https://www.cecp-eu.in/resource-center/completed-projects>, Accessed: September 15, 2024.

India and the European Union is still faced with a lot of practical problems. India and the EU have shown a positive attitude to cooperation in public, but actual implementation has been low. These problems not only affect the depth and effectiveness of existing cooperation, but also pose challenges to the sustainability of future cooperation.

5.2 Fragmented EU Engagement

When it comes to India-EU relations, the role played by the EU is hardly comparable to that of an individual country. The EU has not been a good normative leader in practical cooperation, and the EU's approach to cooperation has weakened the holistic and strategic coherence of the EU's actions, with little practical effectiveness to be achieved. Therefore, India prefers to establish co-operation with EU countries at the national level, and bilateral cooperation mechanisms and projects are more targeted and implementable.

Germany is one of the most important countries for India to cooperate with in Europe. To the field of energy transition, for example, India and the EU in the field of energy cooperation from the establishment of the Indo-German Energy Forum (Indo-German Energy Forum, IGEF) in 2006 since more than 10 years, the two sides have been maintaining more active interaction. It is worth noting that, with the accelerating pace of Germany's energy transition, the prospects of the Indian hydrogen energy market have greatly attracted Germany's interest, and is gradually developing into an emerging area of cooperation between the two sides.¹

As one of the five Nordic countries, Denmark is a leading country in offshore power generation. A look at India's interaction and partnership with Denmark shows more focus on co-operation in the offshore wind sector of clean energy. In contrast, the EU's support program for wind power development is very macro but lacks detail. It is only known that the EU invested up to 30 billion euros in renewable energy in India in 2002, while the rest of the

specific measures are less mentioned.²

Apart from Germany and Denmark, France cooperates most closely with India in the fields of nuclear energy development and ocean governance. The Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (JNPP) is representative of India-France cooperation. France and India have already played a prominent role in the sustainable utilization of marine resources and the maintenance of maritime security. India and France collaborate in the blue economy and ocean governance on the pillars of dialogue, economics, infrastructure and science and academia.³

In summary, while India and countries like Germany and France are more focused on investing and cooperating in specific areas, cooperation at the EU level is more based on ambitious common positions and consensus. The fragmented nature of the EU has given India a great deal of choice, fueling India's 'speculative' strategy of making flexible choices based on its own interests. Such differences have reduced India's cooperation with the EU to some extent to a platform lacking in substance, and the lack of strategic integration of the EU as a whole has led to inefficiencies and wasted resources in India's cooperation with the EU and exacerbated the fragmentation of cooperation.

5.3 Constraints in EU-India Cooperation

Firstly, the divergence of EU member states in terms of policy objectives and resource allocation limits the coherence of its foreign policy, weakening the stability and implementation efficiency of non-traditional security cooperation with India. Second, the EU's Western-centered thinking is reflected in India's cooperation with the EU, and the cooperation model guided by this thinking may lead India to question the equality of cooperation, which is a potential obstacle to deep cooperation between the two sides.⁴

Although the EU's "Indo-Pacific Strategy" plans

¹ Dr. Abdullah Fahimi et al., (Jun 04, 2024). Toward an Indo-German Green Strategic Partnership Aligning Partnership Agreements with Foreign Policy Goals. DGAF Policy Brief, No.18, <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/toward-indo-german-green-strategic-partnership>. Accessed: September, 15 2024.

² European Commission. (May 2022). REPowerEU: Affordable, secure and sustainable energy for Europe. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en#producing-clean-energy. Accessed: 26 January 2025.

³ Zhixin Cheng. (2022). Analysis of the New Trends, Motivations and Prospects of the Strategic Partnership between India and France. *Pacific Journal*, 30, p. 52.

⁴ Farrell, Mary E. (2005). Editorial: EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, p. 461.

its strategy in the Indo-Pacific region in many areas, the EU member states are not united, and the special internal composition of the EU and the divergence of interests between member states have become an important factor restricting the further development of bilateral relations. The EU as a supranational actor has structural obstacles to its common foreign policy that are rooted in the conflict between the sovereign interests of member states and the Union's collective supranational identity. This conflict has led to a triple problem in the EU's external action: a lack of coherence in collective action, inefficient decision-making and a deficit of democratic legitimacy that has weakened the EU's influence in international agenda-setting.

Second, India's domestic political and cultural factors, including domestic party politics and an increasingly strong great-power ideology intertwined with Hindu nationalism, affect India's agenda-setting and willingness to cooperate internationally in non-traditional security areas. Domestic politics and diplomacy are inextricably linked, and domestic politics have a strong influence on foreign policy formulation. Therefore, India's great power strategy has adopted a multi-directional alliance strategy to achieve the 'great power dream' by leveraging the strengths of multiple parties.

In addition, history and culture are the basis for the formation of national security ideology and strategy, which are at the center of diplomatic thought, and the identity of national identity. Kautilya puts forward the 'Mandala Theory' in his Treatise on Politics, which starts from geopolitical factors and constructs four identities, namely, "center state, ally, enemy state and neutral state", thus forming a system of international relations with unique Indian characteristics. ¹He believed that a country can only survive in the international system if it is strong, and whether it can use strategies and policies to achieve the requirements of increasing its strength. This Mandala-centered view is reflected in Indian diplomacy in the form of a distinct hierarchical order, i.e., a differentiated treatment of large and small states. In practice, it would be reflected in a strong desire for expansion, with the monarch striving to move to the center of the mandala

system and become the master. ² The "India-center view" is influenced by this thinking and is linked to India's foreign strategy today. In the cooperation with the EU, the influence of Hindu nationalism cannot be ignored. Take the Indo-Pacific Strategy as an example, there are differences in the understanding, positioning and expected results of this concept. In addition, the projection of Indian nationalism in foreign policy also affects India's perspective on the EU, India tends to regard the relationship with the EU as a kind of complementary diplomacy, and has reservations about its advocacy of a multilateral institution-driven global governance system, and does not fully agree with the EU's emphasis on the norms of the norms-driven global governance structure, and believes that the EU does not play a dominant role, which leads to a mismatch between the two sides in the process of cooperation.

6. Trends in India-EU Non-Traditional Security Cooperation

From the current process of non-traditional security cooperation between India and the EU, the cooperation between the two sides shows a trend of gradual deepening. This paper argues that the future cooperation between India and the EU in the field of non-traditional security will maintain a stable development trend, but by the impact of geopolitical changes in recent years, the future direction of cooperation needs to be further analyzed.

In the future, from the perspective of cooperation topics, India's non-traditional security cooperation with the EU generally shows a structural characteristic from single to composite. In addition, the influence of geopolitical factors should also be controlled in India-EU non-traditional security cooperation. Although the political purpose in international cooperation cannot be ignored, if geopolitical factors overly dominate the relationship and non-traditional security issues themselves are not given sufficient attention, it will lead to a difficult cooperation. Non-traditional security cooperation should not become a tool of geopolitics and a new battleground for traditional security rivalries.

Once upon a time, India was seen as a country

¹ Jincui Zhang. (2013). Artha Shastra and the Classical Roots of India's Diplomatic Strategy. *Foreign Affairs Review*, 30.

² Benoy Kumar Sarkar. (August 1919). Hindu Theory of International Relations. *The American Political Science Review*, 13(3), pp. 400-414.

that needed to passively accept non-traditional security norms, but now India is actively changing its role towards that of a norm advocate, a change that also offers more possibilities for future Indo-European non-traditional security cooperation. Therefore, India and Europe need to establish a more efficient and flexible cooperation mechanism on the basis of equal dialogue, and seek common ground while reserving differences to maximize common interests. If the two sides can establish a more efficient cooperation mechanism in non-traditional security cooperation, it will set an example for global non-traditional security cooperation and play a positive role in promoting a sound global governance system.

7. Conclusion

Because of the transnational nature of non-traditional security issues, international cooperation has become an important means of advancing non-traditional security governance. As a rising power, India's active interest in non-traditional security issues is not only a response to the challenges of globalization, but also an inevitable choice to enhance its voice in international affairs. The EU, on the other hand, in its capacity as a 'norm-setter', seeks to enhance its influence on India and even the Indo-Pacific region by shaping international rules. Climate change governance cooperation, energy transition cooperation, counter-terrorism cooperation and maritime governance cooperation are the four areas of non-traditional security cooperation between India and the EU is the most representative of the four areas and the smoothest progress. The cooperation has involved technical exchanges, financial support and infrastructure development related to non-traditional security issues.

In recent years, India's relationship with the EU has been warming up, and the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy has included India in the EU's group of 'like-minded partner'. However, the current level of non-traditional security cooperation between India and the EU is difficult to break through the bottleneck of the EU's governance effectiveness, and difficult to meet India's needs. Moreover, as non-traditional security issues are not a high priority in India's diplomacy and the EU is not at the center of India's strategic cooperation framework, the future direction of cooperation remains uncertain. To sum up, India's non-traditional security cooperation with the EU presents a typical feature of

'multi-dimensional governance', whose evolutionary trajectory not only reflects the paradigm shift in global security governance, but also exposes a triple contradiction in India's non-traditional security cooperation with the EU: the discrepancy between the mechanism of cooperation and its implementation, the fragmentation of decision-making, and the misalignment of identities.

First, there is a gap between cooperation mechanisms and concrete implementation. India's cooperation mechanism with the EU remains more at the initiative level, lacking a concrete and practical cooperation framework and a regular feedback mechanism, and there is a gap between top-level design and implementation on the ground. Most of the policies cover a wide range of areas, while the in-depth development of specific areas is lacking. Second, the EU governance system has led to fragmentation of decision-making. India's cooperation with individual EU member states, such as France and Germany, has been deeper and more concrete, with more projects on the ground in areas such as hydrogen and wind energy, making the EU's facilitation of this cooperation particularly ineffective. Third, the values factor as the cornerstone of cooperation between the two sides still lacks solidity. Indian-style democracy is not the Western democracy expected by the EU, the heterogeneity of democracy is gradually exposed in the cooperation, and the limited identity of values constrains the construction of strategic mutual trust. The root cause is that the EU is not an integrated decision-making body, and member states prioritize their inputs on different non-traditional security issues, making it difficult to create synergies. India's multilateral hedging strategy, guided by its policy of strategic autonomy, has kept India's strategic maneuvering space in its cooperation with the EU, which is not conducive to further cooperation between the two sides. In addition, the external pressure of the international system, especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India's swing between the Russian and Western camps, further increase the uncertainty of cooperation between the two sides.

In summary, this paper argues that there is still room for further development of EU-India non-traditional security cooperation, and that the two sides should continue to explore their common interests, give full play to their

respective strengths, formulate practical co-operation plans, improve the closed-loop from implementation to evaluation, bridge the differences in culture and values, and set an example of cooperation in global non-traditional security. China, as one of the important countries in the Indo-Pacific region, should pay close attention to the strategic dynamics of India and Europe, and adopt diversified strategies to strengthen its engagement with India, such as expanding humanistic exchanges and strengthening mutual visits of scholars, and gradually trying to carry out project cooperation in low-sensitive areas. In today's era of globalization, all countries should look for consensus amidst differences, promote a mutually beneficial and win-win situation, so as to lay a solid foundation for a stable and far-reaching relationship between the two sides.

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